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LARGE SHAREHOLDER DIVERSIFICATION AND CORPORATE RISK-TAKING 
 
This paper provides direct evidence that firms controlled by non-diversified large shareholders 
invest more conservatively than firms controlled by well diversified large shareholders. The impact of 
large shareholder diversification on corporate risk-taking is both statistically and economically 
meaningful.  
The effect of portfolio diversification on corporate risk-taking has important economic 
implications. Prior studies have shown that entrepreneurs’ willingness to take risks in the pursuit of 
profitable opportunities is a fundamental underpinning of long term economic growth (Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti, 1997, Baumol, Litan, and Schramm, 2007, DeLong and Summers, 1991, John, Litov, and 
Yeung, 2008). Sustained growth, in turn, results in higher levels of economic development. Thus, 
understanding the determinants of risk-taking helps to identify channels through which policy changes 
can improve economic welfare.  
This study has also related implications for the literature that uses ownership concentration as a 
proxy for shareholder portfolio diversification. A central theme in this literature is that if their wealth is 
largely concentrated in the firms they own, risk-averse owners will seek to avoid risk more than they 
would had they held a diversified portfolio. In this literature, authors have used ownership concentration 
as a proxy for both well diversified and undiversified investors, making diametrically opposed 
assumptions about diversification, neither of which presumption is based on hard evidence.
1 Ironically, 
these studies have reached mixed conclusions. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that the presence of block 
positions held by founder families, whom they assume to be undiversified investors, is surprisingly 
associated with higher operating risk. In contrast, Amihud and Lev (1981) find that risk reducing 
investments such as diversifying acquisitions, are less likely when a large blockholder, whom they 
                                                            
1 In the agency literature, studies have focused more specifically on managers’ risk-avoidance behavior in corporate 
investment decisions due to reputational concerns (Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa, 1986, and Hirshleifer and Thakor, 
1992) or to their undiversified human capital (Amihud and Lev, 1981, Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987, Kempf, 
Ruenzi, and Thiele, 2009). Those papers focus on managers’ incentives to lower risk and on the consequent conflict 
of interests between managers and shareholders. 3 
 
assume to be a more diversified investor, is present. In a more recent study, John et al. (2008) find no 
significant relation between ownership concentration and corporate risk-taking.
2 The evidence presented 
in this study provides future researchers with new information regarding appropriate assumptions about 
shareholder diversification.  
To investigate the impact of large shareholder diversification on corporate risk-taking, we exploit 
the data available in Amadeus to reconstruct the stock portfolios of a large panel of shareholders who hold 
equity stakes in privately-held and publicly-traded European firms. In our sample, on average, the largest 
(ultimate) shareholder controls 63.96% of votes across all firm-years. As such, it is very realistic to 
assume that the largest shareholder has effective (and active) control of the firm. Thus, the risk-taking we 
observe is, at least in part, a consequence of large shareholders’ choices.  
We estimate both cross-sectional and panel regressions to investigate the relation between 
owners’ portfolio diversification and corporate risk-taking. We use three proxies to measure 
diversification for each company’s largest shareholder: (i) the (natural log of the) number of firms in 
which this investor holds shares across all countries in our sample; (ii) the Herfindhal index of wealth 
concentration; (iii) and the (natural log of the) number of different 4-digit primary SIC code sectors in 
which the companies in the largest shareholder’s portfolio operate. Our primary measure of firm riskiness 
is the volatility of firm-level profitability over a given 5-year period. Profitability is measured as a firm’s 
return on assets (ROA). We primarily focus on this measure of risk-taking as John et al. (2008) have 
previously documented that the volatility of firm-level profitability has a positive impact on long term 
economic growth. 
We find strong statistical evidence that firms controlled by non-diversified large shareholders 
invest more conservatively than firms controlled by well diversified large shareholders. Further, and more 
importantly, the economic impact of large shareholder diversification on risk-taking is non-negligible. 
Across all OLS specifications, on average, an increase in the level of the largest shareholder’s portfolio 
                                                            
2 Paligorova (2010) examines the extent to which the relation between ownership concentration and corporate risk-
taking is altered when a firm belongs to a business group. She shows that the positive association between 
ownership concentration and corporate risk-taking is specific to firms that belong to a business group.  4 
 
diversification (as measured by Ln No. Firms) from the first to the third quartile of the distribution results 
in a 7.04% increase in the volatility of ROA. Among all explanatory variables, shareholder diversification 
ranks second in terms of economic significance.  
The results are qualitatively similar when we analyze three alternative proxies for firm risk-
taking: the likelihood of survival (which is not subject to the criticism of being potentially affected by 
accounting manipulation), the difference between the maximum and minimum ROA, and the volatility of 
return on equity. The results are also robust to using alternative proxies for portfolio diversification.  
One potential issue with our argument is that our results may be driven by endogeneity. One 
source of concern comes from omitted variables which may affect both risk-taking and diversification 
choices. A second manifestation of endogeneity is reverse causality, where investors buy firms with risk 
profiles that suit their preference for risk, rather than adjusting the risk of the firms they control.
3 
Admittedly, while one cannot fully eliminate concerns of endogeneity with non-experimental data, we 
take a number of steps to address them. While taken individually none of these steps perfectly addresses 
endogeneity, they all confirm our main conclusion.  
First, across all regressions, we control for other observable characteristics beside shareholder 
portfolio diversification that might affect corporate risk-taking. For instance, we control for firm 
profitability, leverage, growth, firm size, and age.  
Second, we show that the positive association between portfolio diversification and corporate 
risk-taking persists in our panel regression analysis, in which we control for both time-varying 
firm/investor characteristics as well as for shareholder fixed-effects. Such a framework has the benefit of 
                                                            
3 Notice, however, that because of the predominance of privately-held firms in our sample (94.61% of the firms in 
our sample are privately-held), on average the largest shareholder controls a super-majority of votes.
 Consequently, 
large shareholders do control corporate risk-taking choices. Further, it may be argued that large shareholders can 
more easily adjust the riskiness of the firms they control than adjusting their illiquid portfolio holdings when the 
riskiness of the firm does not match their taste for risk.  5 
 
controlling for any investor-specific (time-invariant) omitted variables that affect the investor’s decision 
to diversify, such as differences in the shareholder-specific utility function and investor type.
4  
Third, we extract the exogenous component of shareholder diversification by constructing an 
instrumental variable (IV) that captures the “natural” tendency to diversify across all large shareholders 
involved in similar types of activities. For this purpose, we follow Laeven and Levine (2007, 2009) and 
use the average portfolio diversification of large shareholders of all the other companies in the same 
country and industry as an instrumental variable for each shareholder’s degree of portfolio diversification. 
As an alternative instrument, we use the fraction of other firms in the same country and industry whose 
largest shareholder holds a diversified portfolio. 
Fourth, we exploit successions as a natural experiment determining an exogenous shock to the 
portfolio of the heirs. We find that, on average, the portfolio of a successor is less diversified than the 
portfolio of a departed controlling shareholder. In line with our previous findings, the reduction in 
portfolio diversification resulting from an exogenous shock in the identity of the controlling shareholder 
results in a decrease in corporate risk-taking for the firms experiencing such a shock. Additionally, we 
document that the exogenous addition of one or more firms to the portfolio of the heir on average results 
in a significant increase in the level of risk-taking across all other firms in her portfolio.  
By and large, endogeneity does not appear to explain the documented association between 
portfolio diversification and risk-taking. Whether we add various control variables, use fixed-effects, 
instrumental variables, or exploit a natural experiment, we consistently find that portfolio diversification 
per se leads to (more) corporate risk-taking.  
Our results have important policy implications. A rich literature has emphasized the importance 
of developed capital markets as a key factor in stimulating economic growth. This literature goes back at 
                                                            
4 The estimation of panel regressions with fixed effects has become relatively common in the recent U.S.-based 
literature. However, due to the difficulty in gathering ownership data for non U.S. firms, non-U.S. studies typically 
still only exploit the cross-sectional variation in the data and thus largely neglect the omitted variables problem. 6 
 
least to Schumpeter (1912).
5 In this study, we show that diversification (at the shareholder portfolio level) 
is conducive to more corporate risk-taking. To the extent that the presence of more developed capital 
markets allows investors to achieve higher levels of diversification, our results point to a channel through 
which policy changes can have a positive impact on economic welfare. Specifically, policies that promote 
capital market development and facilitate investors’ portfolio diversification are likely to promote 
corporate risk-taking. 
This paper relates in general to the literature investigating the determinants of risk-taking. 
Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho, and Shleifer (2010) show that corporate taxes have a large adverse 
impact on entrepreneurial activities. Djankov et al. (2010) and John et al. (2008) show that better 
protection of property rights has a positive effect on the propensity to start up new businesses and on 
corporate risk-taking. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) survey the literature on the consequences of 
wealth concentration in an economy on the allocation of capital, innovation, and economic growth. The 
authors discuss how wealth concentration in an economy may lead insiders to augment rent-seeking and 
to curtail investment in innovation.  
Finally, our study relates to a large literature on the economic behavior of firms. Our empirical 
analysis allows us to assess the validity of some stylized assumptions in this literature. A typical 
assumption is that corporate insiders are not well diversified. Examples of such studies include Anderson 
and Reeb (2003), John et al. (2008), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Stulz (2005).
6 Our study adds to this 
literature in two ways. First, while we provide hard evidence that the typical large shareholder is 
undiversified,
7 we also document a high degree of heterogeneity across large shareholders. There are in 
                                                            
5 More recent studies include, but are not limited to, Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000), Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) 
and Rajan and Zingales (1998), as well as the studies cited above. 
6 A limited number of papers have made the opposite claim, e.g., that large shareholders hold somewhat diversified 
portfolios (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Amihud and Lev, 1981). Limited empirical evidence that at least some 
large shareholders are well diversified is found in the literature on business groups (Bertrand, Johnson, 
Samphantharak and Schoar, 2008, Bertrand, Metha and Mullainathan, 2002, Faccio, Lang and Young, 2001, Khanna 
and Yafeh, 2005, Morck, 2005).  
7 In the U.S., the portfolios of households investing in the private equity market also appear to be quite concentrated 
(Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). Further evidence of a general lack of portfolio diversification for small 
individual investors is reported in Barber and Odean (2000), Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), Karhunen and 
Keloharju (2001). 7 
 
fact many cases in which the largest shareholder is very well diversified, holding stakes in hundreds of 
firms. Second, while we find some empirical support for the trade-off between holding a dominant 
position in a relatively large firm and achieving a reasonable degree of portfolio diversification (Demsetz 
and Lehn, 1985), we find that the correlation between ownership concentration and portfolio 
diversification is relatively low. For example, the correlation coefficient between ownership concentration 
and the number of firms in which a company’s largest shareholder holds shares is -0.31. This means that, 
while shareholders who hold large ownership stakes in a firm tend to be less diversified than shareholders 
who hold smaller stakes, this relation is relatively weak. This result suggests that caution should be 
exercised when ownership concentration is used as a proxy for the degree of an individual’s presumed 
portfolio diversification, as many large (small) shareholders are in fact well (poorly) diversified. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we describe the data sources used. 
Section II presents descriptive statistics  as well as the results of regressions of risk-taking variables 
against our measures of large shareholder’s portfolio diversification. Section III addresses endogeneity 
concerns. Section IV presents the results of various robustness tests. Section V summarizes our findings 
and concludes. 
I.  Data  
To address our question, we gather (direct) ownership and accounting data for all companies 
included in “Amadeus top 250,000.” Amadeus is one of the Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing’s 
databases.
 This database includes European privately-held and publicly-traded companies that satisfy the 
following criteria. For France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom, 
Amadeus top 250,000 includes companies with revenues of at least €15m, or total assets of at least €30m, 
or at least 200 employees. For the other countries, it includes companies with operating revenues of at 
least €10m, or total assets of at least €20m, or at least 150 employees. The database excludes companies 
with operating revenues per employee or total assets per employee of less than €1,000. Disclosure 
requirements in Europe require private companies to submit their annual accounting and ownership data, 
so that this information is publicly available. However, some limitations exist. For example, in Portugal 8 
 
and Germany many companies fail to comply with the filing requirements. In Bosnia, Macedonia, Russia, 
Serbia & Montenegro, Switzerland, and Ukraine, publication is not required. As a consequence, the 
number of companies with available data is limited in these countries. In Austria, the disclosure of 
financial information only covers a few basic items for small and medium sized enterprises.
8  
A.  Risk-taking Variables 
Our primary measure of corporate risk-taking behavior is the country-adjusted volatility of firm 
profitability, σ(ROA). Profitability is measured by the firm’s return on assets (ROA), defined as the ratio 
of earnings before interests and taxes to total assets. For each year, we compute the difference between a 
firm’s ROA and the average ROA across all non-financial firms in the country in which the company is 
registered. By removing the influence of the home country’s economic cycle, which cannot be controlled 
by the actions of insiders, we have a cleaner measure of the level of risk resulting from corporate 
decisions. In the cross-sectional regressions, we calculate the standard deviation of the adjusted returns 
for each firm over the entire sample period (1999-2007), requiring a minimum of 5 observations. This 
approach is similar to the procedure used by John et al. (2008). In the panel regressions, we measure 
performance volatility over 5-year over-lapping periods (1999-2003, 2000-2004, 2001-2005, 2002-2006, 
and 2003-2007). 
In section IV.A.1, we show that the results are qualitatively similar when, as alternative proxies 
for firm risk-taking, we consider the likelihood of firm survival, as well as other accounting based proxies 
for risk such as the difference between the maximum and minimum ROA, and the volatility of return on 
equity.  
                                                            
8 The inclusion of country or investor fixed effects in the regression specifications does allow us to control for 
systematic differences in the level of diversification (across countries and/or investors) due to differences in the 
cutoffs for inclusion in Amadeus. We nevertheless further verify the robustness of our regression results by focusing 
on countries in which disclosure is mandatory for all private companies. For this sub-sample, we find the 
coefficients of the shareholder diversification variables to be very close in magnitude to those reported later on in 
Table 2. Further, in each specification, the shareholder diversification variable has a p-value of less than 0.001. This 
suggests that differences in the disclosure requirements and/or the requirements for inclusion in Amadeus across 
countries do not have any consequential impact on our results. 9 
 
B.  Ownership and Wealth Diversification Variables 
For each company that has available ownership data, we identify all ultimate shareholders. That 
is, whenever the direct shareholder of a firm is another firm, we identify its owners, the owners of its 
owners, and so on. If a shareholder i owns a fraction     of the shares of firm Y, which owns a fraction 
    of the shares of firm J, we measure shareholder i’s control over voting rights in J (Ultimate Control) 
by the weakest link along the chain, i.e., the minimum of     and    . This approach was earlier used by 
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002). Consistent with the procedure used in 
those papers, we trace ownership of pyramids of any length. A clear improvement in this calculation over 
prior studies is that Amadeus provides information on the ownership of private, as well as public firms, 
which allows us to trace the ownership of unlisted companies.  
After tracing each ownership stake to its ultimate shareholders, we identify the shareholder 
controlling the largest fraction of voting rights in each firm, whom we label as the firm’s Largest 
Ultimate Shareholder. The ownership, control, and diversification variables employed throughout the 
paper always refer to each firm’s largest ultimate shareholder. We focus on the shareholder controlling 
the largest fraction of voting rights in the firm because control of voting rights indicates more power in 
corporate decision making.  
For each shareholder, we also compute the cash flow rights in the firm’s earnings. Using the 
example above, if a shareholder i owns a fraction     of the shares of firm Y, which owns a fraction     
of the shares of firm J, then i will be entitled to a fraction               of the cash flows of J, which we 
label Ultimate Ownership. Because a high level of ownership serves to align the controlling shareholder’s 
incentives with those of minority shareholders, later in the paper we use the ownership variable to address 
the possibility that some of our results may in fact reflect tunneling. 
We develop three proxies of portfolio diversification for each largest shareholder. The first 
measure, Ln No. Firms, is the natural log of the number of companies in which a company’s largest 
ultimate shareholder holds shares, directly or indirectly, in a given year, across all countries in our 10 
 
sample. We build this variable exploiting all information available in Amadeus, including ownership in 
companies for which Amadeus does not disclose any accounting data. We only require that, for a given 
year, based on the data in Amadeus, we are able to identify a particular investor as one of the ultimate 
shareholders of a given firm. A firm is considered part of the shareholder’s portfolio regardless of the size 
of the investor’s stake in that firm.  
The second proxy for portfolio diversification is the Herfindhal Index, a measure of wealth 
concentration for the portfolio owned by each firm’s largest ultimate shareholder. To compute this index, 
we first calculate the dollar value of the investment made by a given shareholder in each firm in her 
portfolio, as the book value of equity of that company,    , multiplied by the shareholder’s ultimate 
ownership stake in that given firm,     . Because we have both public and private companies in the 
sample, we have to rely on book values for this calculation. Additionally, in the calculation of the 
Herfindhal Index we can include only firms with available data for the book value of equity.
9 After 
computing the value of a shareholder’s investment in each firm in her portfolio, we sum the value of these 
investments to obtain the shareholder’s total wealth,      ∑     ·      
 
    . Next, we compute the 
incidence of the investment in each firm in the shareholder’s portfolio, as the ratio of the value of the 
investment made in that given firm over the shareholder’s total wealth,              ·       / ∑     ·
 
   
     . The Herfindhal Index is the sum of the squared values of these weights, ∑    
   
    . The index 
ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating that all wealth is invested in one firm (fully concentrated wealth), 
and 0 indicating a totally diversified portfolio. To ease the interpretation of our results, in the regressions 
we use (1-Herfindhal Index) as an independent variable, so that a higher value of the index denotes a 
more diversified portfolio.  
                                                            
9 We exclude companies with negative book value of equity. As with the Ln No. Firms proxy, we include companies 
that are controlled through pyramids. This leads to some double counting, because the value of a firm controlled 
through a pyramid is counted once in the equity value of that firm itself, and it is counted again in the equity value 
of its parent. In unreported tests, we find that our results are robust to the exclusion of firms controlled through 
pyramids. 11 
 
The third proxy for portfolio diversification, Ln No. Sectors, is the natural log of the number of 4-
digit primary SIC code sectors for the firms in the largest shareholder’s portfolio.  
In the calculation of all ownership or portfolio diversification variables discussed in this section, 
we include ownership in (1) privately-held and publicly-traded firms; (2) domestic and foreign firms; and 
(3) non-financial as well as financial firms. We also include both minority as well as dominant equity 
stakes held by large shareholders. Despite the wide coverage of firms, some limitations nevertheless exist. 
First, we are unable to track investments in smaller companies that are not covered in Amadeus. Given 
that these companies are small, their exclusion is unlikely to have a major impact on our value-based 
portfolio concentration measures, such as the Herfindhal index. Second, we capture equity investments, 
but we miss other significant investments, such as in bonds and real estate. Third, due to Amadeus’s 
coverage, we are unable to include equity investments in firms incorporated outside Europe. Thus, for 
those investors who are truly well diversified internationally and hold stock outside Europe, our 
diversification measures might incorrectly look highly under-diversified. While this is true in some cases, 
it is well known that investors exhibit a strong home bias (e.g., French and Poterba, 1991, and Coval and 
Moskowitz, 1999), so that the magnitude of this measurement error is likely to be small. Further, the 
inclusion of investor fixed-effects in the panel regressions allows us to control for investments (e.g., 
specific stocks, bonds, or real estate) that are present in the portfolio of the investor through time but that 
we are unable to capture because of data limitations. 
Nevertheless, to get a better sense of the magnitude of this measurement error, we use data from 
Worldscope to identify cases in which our largest shareholders hold more than 5% of the equity of any 
non-European publicly traded firm (the 5% cutoff is chosen because of data availability in Worldscope). 
In 1999, out of 15,696 largest shareholders in our dataset, we identified only 72 such cases. Further, to 
rule out the possibility that the ranking of investors based on our measures of portfolio diversification is 
incorrect (this would happen if investors who we classify as non-diversified are especially likely to hold 
equity outside of Europe), we compute the correlation coefficient between (the Amadeus-based)  No. 
Firms and the number of the additional non-European publicly traded firms in which these investors hold 12 
 
equity. For 1999, across all largest shareholders, this correlation coefficient is 0.019, indicating that the 
measurement error is uncorrelated with our measure of portfolio diversification, so that OLS coefficient 
estimators are consistent (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 74).  
C.  Control Variables 
As control variables, we use: (1) Ln (Size), defined as the natural log of total assets (in thousands 
US$), expressed in 1999 prices,
10 where total assets is the sum of fixed assets (tangible and intangible 
fixed assets and other fixed assets) and current assets (inventory, receivables, and other current assets). (2) 
Leverage, defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, where total debt includes non-current liabilities 
(long term debt and other non-current liabilities) and current liabilities (loans, accounts payable and 
others). (3) Profitability, measured by the firm’s return on assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of EBIT to 
total assets. As high ROA volatility may potentially stem from poor management ability rather than risk-
taking choices, we include firm profitability (ROA) in all regressions  to control for differences in 
management quality across firms. (4) Sales Growth, calculated as the annual growth rate of sales. (5) Ln 
(1+Age), defined as the natural log of (1 + the number of years since incorporation).  This variable 
controls for differences in the life cycle of a firm, as one would expect that firm riskiness may decline 
with firm age. All variables are measured at the first year-end of the sample period over which the 
volatility of earnings is measured. In all cross-sectional tests, we also include country and industry fixed 
effects. In the panel analysis, we instead include shareholder and year fixed effects.  
D.  Selection Criteria 
D.1. Ownership Data 
For each company that has ownership data available in Amadeus for at least one year 
during 1999-2003, we first identify all shareholders. (This results in an initial sample of 1,315,558 
shareholder-year observations.) Our ownership sample starts in 1999 because that is the year in which 
                                                            
10 Using country CPI data from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.  13 
 
Amadeus started using a unique identifier for each corporate shareholder in the database. (The quality of 
the data is discussed in Appendix A). The identifier minimizes the chances of classification errors. The 
ownership sample ends in 2003 since we require 5 subsequent years of data to compute the risk-taking 
variables. Because of data constraints, the procedure we use to identify a company’s ultimate shareholders 
differs slightly from that used in Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002). There are three 
main differences. First, we exclude 2,890 firm-year observations that exhibit cross-holdings in their 
ownership structure because the identification of ultimate owners is not always obvious. Second, we 
exclude shareholders who are labelled “private shareholder,” “private citizen,” or “legal person” in 
Amadeus; these shareholders cannot be traced back to a specific individual. (These are 41,878 
shareholder-year observations.) However, we keep the companies in which they own shares in the 
sample, and we track the ownership of all remaining shareholders. Finally, because of the size of our 
sample, we are unable to aggregate investments by members of the same family; thus, each individual is 
treated separately. 
Further, on the basis of ownership categories reported in Amadeus, and on the basis of a careful 
analysis of the owners’ names, we identify firms in which the Government is a shareholder.
11 These are 
24,482 firm-year observations. We exclude these firms from the analysis because the motivations for 
government intervention in the economy and governments’ risk-taking preferences are typically different 
from those of private investors.  After these filters, we are left with ownership data for 1,198,372 
shareholder-year observations, which include 243,856 different firms. These screening criteria are 
summarized in Appendix B, Panel A. 
D.2. Accounting Data 
We gather accounting data for all non-financial
12 firms having data available for both total assets 
                                                            
11 We check whether the shareholder’s name reported by Amadeus contains terms such as “Ministry”, “State of”, 
“Government”, “Treasury”, “Council”, in different languages. 
12 We include investments in financial firms (e.g., companies with a primary 4-digit SIC between 6000 and 6999) in 
calculating ultimate control, ownership, and portfolio diversification. However, financial firms are excluded from 
subsequent analyses because their risk-taking behavior is heavily influenced by regulation. 14 
 
and EBIT for at least one year during 1999-2007. This results in an initial “accounting” sample of 
1,754,714 firm-year observations. To ensure the accuracy of the accounting variables, we compare them 
to values computed using accounting identities (further tests are discussed in Appendix A). For example, 
when fixed assets is missing, we compute it by summing “intangible fixed assets,” “tangible fixed assets,” 
and “other fixed assets;” similarly, we compute “current assets” by summing “current assets stocks” 
(inventory), “current assets debtors” (receivables), and “other current assets.” If the value of fixed assets 
or current assets is missing in Amadeus, but we are able to compute it using one of the accounting 
identities, we use the computed value.  We eliminate observations whenever the Amadeus value and the 
computed value differ by more than 5 percent. This process affects only a small number of observations, 
but it is important to remove possible data errors. In a number of cases, we discover a small difference 
between the Amadeus value and the computed value. Further verification indicates that this difference is 
usually due to Amadeus adding or dropping decimals, and is thus not consequential. When this occurs, we 
use the figures originally reported in Amadeus.  
To further reduce the impact of outliers, across all analyses, accounting variables other than sales 
growth and leverage are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. As sales growth and 
leverage exhibit large positive skewness, these two variables are winsorized at the bottom 1% and at the 
top 5% of the distribution.
  Age was winsorized at the top 1% of the distribution. The results are 
qualitatively similar if we trim observations at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution, or winsorize all 
variables at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. 
We then restrict the sample to companies with data available for both total assets and EBIT for at 
least 5 years, because a 5-year period is required to compute the volatility of ROA, our main dependent 
variable. These requirements reduce the sample to 1,208,666 firm/year observations from 168,193 firms. 
After merging these data with the ownership data sample, we retain only firms that meet two criteria. 
First, the firm must have enough data to compute the volatility of ROA for at least one period (t,t+4), i.e., 
at least 5 years of accounting data. And second, for each of these 5 year periods, the firm must have 
ownership data at the first year-end. Applying these criteria reduces the sample to 332,301 firm/year 15 
 
observations from 50,049 firms. Finally, we exclude firms with no data for the main control variables, 
leaving us with a final sample of 123,640 firm/year observations from 46,691 firms for the main cross-
sectional and panel tests. These selection criteria are summarized in Appendix B, Panels B and C. 
II.  Results  
A.  Univariate Results 
Table I reports descriptive statistics for all non-financial firms included in the panel regressions. 
This sample includes 123,640 firm-year observations. In Panel A, we provide information on the country 
distribution of observations. Although our sample includes at least two firms from 30 different countries, 
three countries represent an overwhelming fraction of the sample: the United Kingdom (27.39%), France 
(25.12%), and Spain (15.65%).  
[Table I goes here] 
In Panel B, we report descriptive statistics for the sample. The mean (median) 5-year volatility of 
ROA is 0.055 (0.044), with a standard deviation of 0.042. On average, the largest shareholder holds a 
stake in 4 firms. Thus, large shareholders are moderately diversified. This figure is similar to estimates 
reported in Barber and Odean (2000), Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), and Karhunen and Keloharju 
(2001); they show that an average investor (not necessarily a blockholder) holds equity in 2-7 publicly-
traded firms. A comparable level of diversification is documented by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen 
(2002) for U.S. households investing in the private equity market. The distribution of our portfolio 
diversification variable is relatively skewed. The median large shareholder in the sample is totally non-
diversified, holding a stake in only 1 firm. However, 43.55% of investors are at least somewhat 
diversified, holding equity in two or more companies. In fact, 14.75% of investors hold stakes in 5 
companies or more; 6.63% of investors hold equity in 10 companies or more; 0.87% of investors hold 
equity in 50 firms or more; finally, 0.34% of investors hold equity in over 100 firms. Some shareholders 
are extremely diversified, holding stake in as many as 972 firms. Thus, it is hard to make generalizations 
about large shareholders’ level of portfolio diversification.  16 
 
An alternative measure of portfolio diversification is (1-Herfindhal Index), for which a higher 
value denotes more diversification. For (1-Herfindhal Index), the highest possible value, 1, denotes 
perfect diversification, and the lowest possible value, 0, denotes no diversification at all. In our sample, 
the mean value of (1- Herfindhal Index) is 0.174. This value is relatively low, which means that although 
the average large shareholder holds equity stakes in four different firms, most of her wealth is 
concentrated in one of them. To give an example, if the average largest shareholder instead invested 
equally in the 4 firms, (1- Herfindhal Index) would equal 0.75. A coefficient of 0.174 is consistent with a 
shareholder putting about 91% of her wealth in one company and distributing the rest equally among the 
remaining 3 firms. Not all investors are the same, however: in fact, while many investors are totally non-
diversified, some others are extremely well diversified.  
We find that investors tend to diversify across industries, not just across firms. The average 
investor holds equity in 2.13 different industries. The most diversified shareholder in the sample holds 
equity in 232 different sectors. 
The sample includes both very large and small firms. The typical firm is highly levered, with an 
average (median) leverage ratio of 67.5% (70.5%). Companies appear to be relatively profitable, with an 
average ROA of 7.1%. The sample firms exhibit a wide range of growth rates, with a mean (median) 
annual rate of growth of sales of 25.1% (9%). The average (median) firm in our sample is 25 (18) years 
old. 
On average, the largest shareholder owns 62.29% of a company’s cash flow rights (i.e., is entitled 
to 62.29% of the dividends), and controls 63.96% of voting rights. Thus, the largest blockholders are 
indeed very large and influential investors. This raises the question of whether large investors are more or 
less likely to hold diversified portfolios than small investors. Our evidence suggests a tradeoff between 
owning a large fraction of cash flow rights and being able to hold a diversified portfolio. We find a 
negative correlation between the fraction of cash flow rights owned by the largest shareholder and the 
diversification level of her portfolio. However, the correlation coefficient between ultimate ownership and 
the number of firms in which a large shareholder holds equity is only -0.31. Similarly, we find a 17 
 
correlation of -0.32 between ultimate ownership and (1- Herfindhal Index), and a correlation of -0.34 
between ultimate ownership and the number of sectors in which a large shareholder holds equity.  
B.  Regression Analysis 
To analyze the economic impact of the largest shareholder’s portfolio diversification on corporate 
risk-taking, we present two main sets of tests. The first set includes ordinary least squares cross sectional 
regressions of (country-adjusted) volatility of firm-level profitability,       , against proxies for large 
shareholder diversification, along with a number of variables, xnj, that control for other determinants of 
risk-taking that might otherwise induce spurious correlations. (In particular, we control for leverage, 
profitability, sales growth, firm size, and firm age.) In a similar vein to John et al., (2008), we isolate 
firms for which we have a minimum of five years of ROA data over 1999-2007. For these companies, we 
then compute the standard deviation of the (country-adjusted) ROA over all the available data points. 
Therefore, for each firm, we generate a single observation of       . The control variables are 
measured, for each firm, at the first available year-end (or, for the flow variables, during the first year). 
Our regression equation is: 
σ           +                                         +           
 
   
  
+ Industry  . .+           . .    
(1) 
 
In all cross-sectional regressions we include industry (Industry F.E.) and country fixed-effects (Country 
F.E.).  
The second set of regression tests uses a panel of observations to investigate how the volatility of 
firm earnings changes in response to changes in the largest shareholder’s portfolio diversification. The 
panel regressions allow us to control for unobservable shareholder-specific characteristics that impact the 
largest shareholder’s risk-taking decisions by using fixed effects. For example, it is possible that the effect 
of risk-aversion on risk-taking depends not only on the dominant shareholder’s level of portfolio 18 
 
diversification,
13 but also on the dominant shareholder’s utility function. Shareholder-fixed effects 
control, among other things, for differences in the shareholder-specific utility function as well as 
differences in shareholder type (Paligorova, 2010). More generally, the use of a panel of data, alongside 
the inclusion of fixed effects allows us to control for any shareholder specific characteristic which may be 
correlated with the omitted explanatory variables. Controlling for shareholder fixed effects helps reduce 
the omitted variable bias which would render our estimated coefficients biased and inconsistent 
(Wooldridge, 2002). In this second set of tests, our regression equation is: 
σ     ,  ,           +                                           +            
 
   
+  
  +  Shareholder  . .+        . .      
(2) 
 
Large Shareholder Diversification   is the proxy for large shareholder diversification; xnjt are controls for 
other (unobservable) determinants of profitability that might otherwise induce spurious correlations; 
Shareholder  . . are shareholder fixed effects, and       . . are year fixed effects.  
 [Table II goes here] 
The results for the cross-sectional tests are reported in Table II. In these tests, the standard 
deviation of the firm’s ROA is the dependent variable. In the first regression, our measure of shareholder 
diversification is Ln No. Firms, the natural log of the number of companies in which a company’s largest 
ultimate shareholder holds shares. In the second specification, we use (1- Herfindhal Index), and in the 
third we use Ln No. Sectors, the natural log of the number of 4-digit primary SIC code sectors for the 
firms in the largest shareholder’s portfolio. In all three specifications, a higher value of the independent 
variable reflects a higher degree of portfolio diversification. 
                                                            
13 An alternative test of risk-aversion would be to look at the correlation between the firm’s weight in the investor’s 
portfolio,    , and the volatility of the firm’s earnings. By construction, this variable is highly correlated with 
portfolio diversification; non-diversified shareholders by definition invest 100% of their wealth in the only firm they 
control. Therefore, we do not include this variable in the regressions in which we control for shareholder 
diversification. As reported in the robustness tests section, we find that risk-taking is lower among firms having 
larger weights in large shareholders’ portfolios.  19 
 
The results for all three specifications indicate that shareholder diversification is positively and 
significantly related to firm risk-taking. All three coefficients on the shareholder diversification variables 
are positive, with a p-value of less than 0.001. This result provides direct and robust statistical evidence 
that well diversified large shareholders are willing to accept greater firm-level risk. The economic impact 
of shareholder diversification on risk-taking is non-negligible. On average, an increase in the level of 
portfolio diversification, as measured by the natural log of the total number of companies in which a 
company’s largest ultimate shareholder holds shares, from the top of the first to the top of the third 
quartile of the distribution results in a 6.86% increase in the volatility of ROA. An increase in (1-
Herfindhal Index) from the first to the third quartile is associated with a 7.92% increase in the volatility of 
ROA. Similarly, an increase in the number of sectors in which a company’s largest ultimate shareholder 
holds shares from the first to the third quartile is associated with a 5.25% increase in the volatility of 
ROA. Interestingly, diversification across firms has a greater impact on risk-taking than diversification 
across sectors. 
By comparison, in the first regression, an increase in leverage from the first to the third quartile is 
associated with a 3.59% increase in the volatility of ROA; an increase in ROA from the first to the third 
quartile is associated with a 3.95% increase in the volatility of ROA; an increase in the rate of growth of 
sales from the first to the third quartile is associated with a 4.51% increase in the volatility of ROA; an 
increase in size from the first to the third quartile is associated with a 20.32% decrease in the volatility of 
ROA; and an increase in Ln (1+Age) from the first to the third quartile is associated with a 3.55% 
decrease in the volatility of ROA. Thus, among all regressors, shareholder diversification ranks second in 
terms of economic significance. 
The control variables exhibit consistent signs across the specifications. Further, their signs are 
consistent with those reported in John et al. (2008). In particular, in their Table III, John et al. (2008) use 
the volatility of EBITDA/Total assets as a proxy for risk-taking. In their regressions, they find leverage to 
be positively but insignificantly associated with risk-taking. We find leverage to be positively and 
significantly related to the volatility of ROA. They find the level of profitability at the beginning of the 20 
 
sample period to be insignificantly related to risk-taking. We find that the initial ROA is positively and 
significantly associated with risk-taking. They find sales growth to be positively (sometimes significantly) 
related to risk-taking. We find it to be positively related to risk-taking. They find that firm size is 
negatively and significantly associated with the volatility of EBITDA/Total assets. We also find size to be 
negatively and significantly associated with the volatility of ROA. In their specifications, they also find 
some interesting results for a number of country-level attributes. As country-level variables are not the 
focus of our interest, we employ country fixed effects instead. Our country fixed effects incorporate those 
effects. We additionally find that risk-taking is a function of the firm’s life cycle. In particular, as 
expected, risk-taking decreases with firm age. (The relation between firm age and corporate risk-taking 
was not analyzed in John et al., 2008). 
[Table III goes here] 
Table III presents the results for the panel regressions. In this second set of tests we include 
shareholder fixed effects to control for time-invariant shareholder characteristics. In these regressions, the 
coefficients of the diversification variables can be interpreted as the impact of changes in portfolio 
diversification on changes in the level of risk-taking. These results show that an increase (decline) in 
portfolio diversification is associated with an increase (decline) in risk-taking. Across all specifications, 
we continue to find a statistically significant, positive relation between portfolio diversification and firm 
risk-taking, providing further evidence in support of the hypothesis that well diversified shareholders are 
willing to invest in riskier firms. While the statistical significance of our results is marginally diminished 
when shareholder fixed effects are included among the control variables, the shareholder diversification 
variables continue to remain statistically significant, with p-values of 0.015 or less.  
In the panel regressions, the economic impact of changes in the level of shareholder 
diversification on changes in firm risk-taking is about two-thirds the magnitude found in the cross-
sectional regressions. On average, an increase in the level of diversification, as measured by Ln No. 
Firms, from the first to the third quartile results in a 4.28% increase in the volatility of ROA. An increase 
in (1-Herfindhal Index) from the first to the third quartile of the distribution is associated with a 4.32% 21 
 
increase in the volatility of ROA. An increase in Ln No. Sectors from the first to the third quartile of the 
distribution is associated with a 4.16% increase in the volatility of ROA.  
III.  Reverse Causality 
In the previous section, we first addressed endogeneity concerns arising from omitted variables 
by controlling for time-varying observables that may affect both risk-taking and diversification. We 
further added investor fixed-effects to the regression specifications to control for time invariant 
unobservables that differ across large shareholders. Another possible endogeneity concern, however, 
relates to the direction of causality in our results. Reverse causality would require that there be some 
feedback effects moving from risk-taking to portfolio diversification. For example, investors planning to 
invest in risky (less risky) firms would, as a consequence, adjust the structure of their holdings so as to 
increase (decrease) portfolio diversification. 
Notice that such a story implies frequent changes to the portfolios held by large shareholders that 
are simply not observed in the data. In fact, as almost 95% of the firms in our sample are illiquid 
privately-held companies, it is easy to argue that large shareholders can more easily adjust the riskiness of 
the firms they control, than adjusting the portfolio holdings. We report two formal tests addressing the 
reverse causality issue. In the first test we utilize an instrumental variables technique. In the second test 
we utilize a natural experiment.  
A.  Instrumental Variables Regressions 
We first attempt at extracting the exogenous component of shareholder diversification by 
constructing an instrumental variable (IV) that captures the “natural” tendency to diversify across all large 
shareholders involved in similar types of activities. For this purpose, we follow Laeven and Levine (2007, 
2009) and, for each firm, we compute the average portfolio diversification of large shareholders across all 
other companies in the same country and industry. This variable is then employed as an IV for each 
shareholder’s degree of portfolio diversification. As an alternative (although related) instrument, we use 22 
 
the fraction of other firms in the same country and industry whose largest shareholder holds a diversified 
portfolio. 
 [Table IV goes here] 
In the first stage regressions, we use all exogenous variables along with the “natural” degree of 
portfolio diversification for each company’s largest shareholder to explain a large shareholder’s actual 
diversification choice. (In Table IV, we only report the coefficient and the p-value for the IV). In the 
second stage, we employ the predicted value of the largest shareholder’s degree of portfolio 
diversification. The IV estimates are consistent under the assumption that the IVs are correlated with the 
endogenous variable but have no direct or indirect effect on the outcome under study. To assess the 
relevance of our IV, we compute the F-statistic and the partial R
2 on the instruments in the first-stage 
regression. As shown in Regression (1) of Table IV, the “natural” degree of portfolio diversification is 
highly correlated with the endogenous variable, with an F-stat of 1,386 and a partial R
2 of 0.032. (As a 
rule of thumb, an F-statistic below 10 would be suggestive of a weak instrument, as discussed in Staiger 
and Stock, 1997). In the second IV specification, we report an F-stat of 1,969 and a partial R
2 of 0.034. 
These results alleviate possible concerns that our coefficient estimators suffer from biases due to having 
weak instruments (Bound, Jaeger, and Baker, 1995). More importantly, with either instrumental variable, 
the (second stage) regression results continue to indicate more-risk taking among firms controlled by well 
diversified large shareholders.  
A limitation of the IVs above, however, is that they might capture the extent of competition 
within an industry/country, which might itself directly or indirectly affect corporate risk-taking through 
other channels (e.g., competition might affect profitability, which in turn might affect risk-taking 
choices). We attempt to circumvent this concern by running our IV regressions for the sub-set of 
continental European firms and alternatively measuring our IVs across U.K. firms. The presumption here 
is that U.K. firms only indirectly compete in the continental European landscape. This presumption is 23 
 
supported by the data as, based on the CIA’s World Factbook,
14 the U.K. does not appear among the top 
three import partners for any of the continental European countries in our sample. With either one of the 
IVs, the second stage results in regressions (3) and (4) confirm a large impact of large shareholder 
portfolio diversification on corporate risk-taking. Thus, the IV regressions are consistent with the view 
that large shareholder portfolio diversification leads to more risk-taking. 
B.  A Natural Experiment 
As a further alternative test, we exploit successions as a natural experiment determining an 
exogenous shock to the portfolio of some investors (the heirs). To identify successions, we first search for 
all instances in which a company’s largest shareholder changes. We then restrict the sample to those 
instances in which the departed shareholder disappears from the ownership structure of a given firm in the 
years subsequent to the ownership change. We further require that the new and the departed shareholder 
share the same last name. Finally, we run keyword searches in Lexis-Nexis, Factiva, and Google to 
identify (and remove) any instances in which the transaction in question is described as something other 
than a succession (e.g., a sale of shares). The application of these screenings yields a sample of 102 
successions. 
[Table V goes here] 
We conduct two tests. In the first test, we examine the change in corporate risk-taking among 
companies experiencing an exogenous change in the identity of their largest shareholder. The results of 
this test are reported in Panel A of Table V. Of course, changes in risk-taking can be measured only when 
we have at least 5 years of (ROA) data pre-succession as well as 5 years of data post-succession to 
compute the standard deviation of ROA. This requirement reduces the sample in Panel A to 84 
observations.  
We first document that, on average, the shock results in a drop in the degree of portfolio 
diversification as the departed shareholder (typically an older individual) tends to be more diversified than 
                                                            
14 https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook  24 
 
the incoming heir. As a consequence of this exogenous reduction in the degree of portfolio 
diversification, we expect risk-taking to decline, which is what the test shows. In particular, on average, 
the standard deviation of ROA drops from 4.5% pre-succession to 3.8% post-succession. Despite the 
small sample size, this change is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.079. To compare the 
magnitude of this change to the change implied by the regression coefficients, we compute the ratio of the 
change in corporate risk-taking (the Δy in the regressions) relative to the change in portfolio 
diversification (the Δx in the regressions), as measured by Ln No. Firms. We find this ratio to be equal to 
8.075. This indicates that the regression coefficients (especially those in the panel regressions) understate 
the economic significance of large shareholder diversification on corporate risk-taking. 
We further exploit successions to develop a second test. In this test we examine the change in 
risk-taking across all other firms in the portfolio of the heir following the succession.
15 By definition, this 
test can only be run to the extent that the heir held stocks in at least one company prior to the succession. 
Further, as in the previous test, we require 5 years of (ROA) data pre-succession as well as 5 years of data 
post-succession in order to measure changes in the level of risk-taking. These requirements yield a sample 
of 29 firms. As, absent any sales, the succession exogenously increases the degree of portfolio 
diversification for the heir, we expect risk-taking to increase as well. In Panel B of Table V we first 
document that, as effect of the succession, the portfolio of the heir indeed becomes more diversified. 
More importantly, we show that, as a consequence, the level of corporate risk-taking increases as well. In 
particular, the standard deviation of ROA increases from 4.8% pre-succession to 7.0% post-succession. 
Despite the small size of this sample, the change is statistically significant at conventional levels (p-value 
= 0.090). Once again, we compare the magnitude of this change to the change implied by the regression 
results by computing the ratio of the change in corporate risk-taking relative to the change in portfolio 
diversification. We find this ratio to be equal to 2.955.  
                                                            
15 To minimize the loss of observations due to missing values, we gather additional data on ROA from FAME (a 
product of Bureau van Dijk that contains comprehensive information on firms in the UK and Ireland), OneSource, 
Lexis-Nexis and Mergent WebReports.  25 
 
By and large, we conclude that reverse causality does not appear to generate the documented 
association between portfolio diversification and risk-taking. Whether using instrumental variables or 
exploiting a natural experiment, we continue to find that portfolio diversification per se leads to (more) 
corporate risk-taking. The results in this section also indicate that the previously estimated marginal 
effects are likely to understate the true economic significance of the impact of portfolio diversification on 
risk-taking as both the IV coefficients and those implied by the natural experiment are substantially larger 
than those in the OLS or in the fixed-effects regressions. 
IV.  Robustness Tests 
In this section, we assess the robustness of our results to a number of alternative variable 
specifications, and we consider alternative interpretations of the relation between risk-taking and large 
shareholder diversification. 
A.  Alternative Variables Definitions 
A.1. Risk-Taking 
One could argue that we are not actually measuring the amount of risk that shareholders are 
willing to engage in, as ROA is not controlled just by the actions of mangers/large shareholders but it is 
also the outcome of environmental outcomes and/or the result of managerial competence. We believe 
such criticism is inappropriate. First, we remove the influence of factors that cannot be controlled by the 
actions of insiders, such as home country’s economic cycle, by focusing on the difference between a 
firm’s ROA and the average ROA across all non-financial firms in the country in which the company is 
registered. Second, in all specifications we control for managerial skills/competence by including firm 
performance among the control variables. Third, as we show later in Section IV.B.1., our results cannot 
be explained by a tunnelling story. Fourth, we compare our primary risk-taking proxy with measures used 
in prior studies, such as John et al. (2008) and Djankov et al. (2010). At the country level, the correlation 
coefficient between our standard deviation of ROA and the measure of risk-taking employed by John et 26 
 
al. (2008) is 0.87. The correlation coefficient between our standard deviation of ROA and the “average 
entry rate” (e.g., entrepreneurs’ propensity to start-up a new business) in Djankov et al. (2010) is 0.53. 
Thus, our measure of risk-taking appears to share underlying commonalities with the measures used in 
earlier studies of finance and growth. 
Nevertheless, we verify the robustness of our results to three alternatives to our specification for 
the dependent variable, firm riskiness. First, we exploit the idea that firms that take more risk are less 
likely to survive through time. Hence, we look at the likelihood of surviving 5 years for all firms with 
accounting and ownership data for at least one year during 1999-2003. A clear advantage of this 
specification is that it does not suffer from any survivorship bias, as both surviving and non-surviving 
companies are included in the sample. This variable has the additional benefit of not suffering of the 
problems of accounting-based variables, such as being potentially affected by manipulation by insiders. 
To analyze the likelihood of survival, we employ Logit models, in which the outcome is 1 if a company 
survives 5 years, and 0 otherwise. In our sample, 45.15% of firms survive a 5-year period. The Logit 
results are reported in Panel A of Table VI. They document lower survival rates for companies controlled 
by diversified shareholders; all coefficients for portfolio diversification variables are negative and highly 
significant. This is consistent with the notion that companies controlled by diversified shareholders tend 
to engage in riskier projects.  
[Table VI goes here] 
The second alternative measure of firm risk that we test is the difference between the maximum 
and minimum ROA reported over the 5-year interval. Results are reported in Panel B of Table VI. In 
columns (1) – (3), we report results for cross-sectional tests similar to those in Table II; in columns (4)-
(6), we report results for panel regressions comparable to those in Table III. The results are qualitatively 
similar to those reported in Tables II and III and confirm that portfolio diversification is positively 
associated with risk-taking; all coefficients on portfolio diversification terms are positive and have p-
values of less than 0.019.  
Third, we use the standard deviation of a firm’s return on equity (ROE), rather than the standard 27 
 
deviation of ROA, as the measure of firm riskiness. ROE is the ratio of net income to shareholders’ funds. 
The standard deviation of ROE reflects both the riskiness of a firm’s projects and the additional risk 
induced by the use of leverage in the capital structure. The results are reported in Panel C of Table VI. As 
in Panel B, columns (1) – (3) report cross-sectional tests, and columns (4) – (6) report panel-regression 
results. Consistent with previously reported tests, the results indicate that portfolio diversification is 
positively and significantly related to firm risk-taking. Furthermore, the economic impact of portfolio 
diversification on risk-taking is greater when volatility of ROE, rather than volatility of ROA, is the firm 
risk-taking proxy. The larger economic impact suggests that diversified shareholders use leverage to 
further increase firm risk-taking.  
A.2. Portfolio Diversification 
We also consider two alternative proxies for portfolio diversification. First, we employ a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if a shareholder holds more than one company in her portfolio, and zero otherwise. 
Our cross-sectional test (Column (1) of Table VII) shows that this variable is highly significant in 
explaining risk-taking. Consistent with our previous findings, shareholders who hold a diversified 
portfolio are likely to take more risk (p-value < 0.001). 
[Table VII goes here] 
The second measure of investor portfolio diversification that we test is the weight of a firm in the 
largest investor’s portfolio, ωij. For a totally non-diversified shareholder, her single investment will have a 
weight of 1 (e.g., 100%) relative to her total wealth. For a diversified shareholder, weights will be less 
than 1. For consistency with prior regressions, we use (1-ωij), so that a larger (smaller) number denotes a 
more diversified (less diversified) portfolio. The results are reported in column (2) of Table VII. The 
results are consistent with our previous results; increased shareholder portfolio diversification is 
associated with greater firm risk-taking (p-value < 0.001). 28 
 
B.  Other Interpretations 
B.1. Tunneling and Risk-Taking  
An additional concern is that higher risk-taking by diversified large shareholders might simply 
reflect tunneling (Bertrand et al., 2002, John et al., 2008, Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and 
Shleifer, 2000). For example, consider a large shareholder who has fewer cash flow rights in one firm and 
more rights in a second firm. This investor would instruct the company in which she has fewer cash flow 
rights to take excess risk, and then she would siphon off any gains from this firm to the company in which 
she has more cash flow rights (see John et al., 2008, pp. 1684-1685, for a formal discussion). As a 
consequence, over time, the performance of companies in which the dominant shareholder has fewer cash 
flow rights would be more volatile. If this were the case, the higher level of corporate risk-taking that we 
observe is not necessarily associated with high-risk positive-NPV investments, and this strategy might 
actually lead to lower growth ex-post and/or economic instability. To rule out this possibility, we 
investigate the relation between ownership concentration and risk-taking.  
The tunneling hypothesis predicts more (less) risk-taking by companies in which the largest 
shareholder holds fewer (more) cash flow rights. The inclusion of an ownership variable is also useful to 
compare our results with those in earlier work by Amihud and Lev (1981) and Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
who found higher ownership concentration to be associated with more firm risk – the opposite of what the 
tunneling hypothesis predicts. (A positive association between ownership concentration and risk-taking is 
also documented in the banking literature. See, for example, Saunders, Strock, and Travlos, 1990, and 
Laeven and Levine, 2009).  
As shown in column (3) of Table VII, we find a positive and significant relation between 
ownership concentration and risk-taking (p-value < 0.001).
16 This result is inconsistent with tunneling. 
While consistent with the results in Amihud and Lev (1981), our results are inconsistent with their 
interpretation, which is that the presence of blockholders, whom they assume to be more diversified 
                                                            
16 Similarly, in unreported tests, we find less risk-taking in companies located further down in a pyramid, which are 
more likely to have a high discrepancy between ultimate control and ultimate ownership.  29 
 
investors, is associated with more risk-taking. We have shown earlier that larger blockholders tend to be 
relatively less diversified than smaller blockholders. The positive relation between ownership 
concentration and risk-taking is, instead, consistent with empirical evidence that ownership and incentive 
schemes with convex payoffs induce insiders to take on more risk (e.g., Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987, 
Coles, Daniel, and Neveen, 2006, Guay, 1999). Our result is also consistent with the recent findings by 
Paligorova (2010), who shows that companies that are part of business groups exhibit a positive 
association between ownership concentration and corporate risk-taking. For our purposes, the important 
finding is that the relation between risk-taking and portfolio diversification is unchanged after controlling 
for ownership concentration. The coefficient on the portfolio diversification variable is positive, and both 
statistically and economically significant.  
B.2. Firm-Level Diversification and Risk-Taking 
It might be argued that the association between large shareholders’ portfolio diversification and 
firm risk is actually the result of the level of diversification at the firm-level. A firm with an overall well-
diversified set of risky projects might have low volatility of profitability, even though the individual 
projects are high-risk and high NPV investments. In this situation, the low volatility of profitability would 
not be associated with low economic growth. To rule out the possibility that low firm risk is driven 
primarily by diversification at the firm level, rather than by investors’ portfolio diversification, we add a 
control for the number of 4-digit SIC sectors in which a company operates. The results are reported in 
column (4) of Table VII. As expected, we find that firm-level diversification is associated with lower 
volatility of ROA. More importantly, after controlling for firm-level diversification, we continue to find 
that greater investor portfolio diversification is associated with more risk-taking at the firm level.  
C.  Other Robustness Tests 
C.1. Institutional Determinants of Risk-Taking  
In our earlier cross-sectional tests, we included country fixed effects to control for the effect of 30 
 
any country-specific factors that influence firm risk-taking choices. However, the analysis of which 
factors have an impact on risk-taking is potentially interesting. In this section, we include two variables 
representing the quality of institutions within each country; security of property rights and the level of 
earnings management. 
As proxy for the security of property rights, we include the revised Anti-Director Rights index, 
which “is formed by summing: (1) vote by mail; (2) shares not deposited; (3) cumulative voting; (4) 
oppressed minority; (5) pre-emptive rights; and (6) capital to call a meeting.” This index is taken from 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). As a proxy for the quality of accounting 
information we use the Aggregate Earnings Management Score, computed as the average rank across 
“the country’s median ratio of the firm-level standard deviations of operating income and operating cash 
flow,” “the country’s Spearman correlation between the change in accruals and the change in cash flow 
from operations,” “the country’s median ratio of the absolute value of accruals and the absolute value of 
the cash flow from operations” and the “number of “small profits” divided by the number of “small 
losses” for each country.” This index is taken from Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006). It is built such that 
a higher value denotes a higher degree of earnings management.  
The results reported in column (5) of Table VII show that risk-taking is significantly higher in 
countries that provide stronger protection of shareholder rights. Further, we find that earnings 
management is negatively correlated with risk-taking. Both results are consistent with earlier evidence in 
John et al. (2008). More importantly, shareholder diversification remains positively and significantly 
related to risk-taking after controlling for these two specific institutional differences across countries.  
C.2. Non-U.K. Firms 
As we pointed out earlier, the ownership data in Amadeus for the U.K. appears to be relatively 
noisy compared to the data from other countries in the sample. While this is likely to have no effect other 
than bias against finding significant results, we would like to confirm that this data problem does not 
affect our central finding. For this purpose, we re-run our tests excluding U.K. firms. The results are 31 
 
reported in column (6) of Table VII. For the non-U.K. sample, we continue to find a positive and 
significant association between shareholder diversification and risk-taking. Results are similar to those 
reported for the whole sample. Thus, we conclude that the noise introduced by the inclusion of U.K. firms 
does not impact our main result. 
C.3. Majority-Controlled Firms 
Another potential weakness in our argument is that the largest shareholders may not always have 
actual control over the risk-taking decisions made by firms. Among the largest shareholders who control  
at least 50% of a firm’s voting rights, it is more likely that the large shareholder can and does influence 
the firm’s risk-taking decisions. Thus, in column (7) of Table VII, we show results of the cross-sectional 
regression run on a subsample that includes only companies in which the largest shareholder controls 
50% of voting rights or more. The results confirm our previous evidence: there is a positive and 
significant relation between portfolio diversification and risk-taking.  
V.  Conclusions  
It is commonly assumed in the economics and finance literature that risk-averse insiders will 
avoid firm-level risk because their wealth is concentrated in a few firms. For example, John et al. (2008, 
p. 1683) argue that:  
“…[t]he resources available to dominant insiders, including both their equity ownership and the 
private benefits of control, are inevitably concentrated within the firms they control, that is, 
because of their large exposure to these firms, these dominant insiders are likely to direct the 
corporations they control to invest more conservatively than they would if they held a 
diversified portfolio of firms.”  
 
In this literature, because of data limitations, authors have traditionally used ownership 
concentration to proxy for portfolio diversification, despite the lack of hard evidence supporting any 
assumptions about diversification. They have reached mixed conclusions. As a preliminary step, we 
reconstruct the portfolios of shareholders who hold the largest equity position in privately-held and 
publicly-traded European firms. These new data allow us to revisit some standard assumptions and thus 32 
 
contribute to this literature. Although our evidence indicates that, on average, a company’s largest 
shareholder is highly undiversified, we observe great heterogeneity in the degree of diversification across 
shareholders. We show that there are many cases in which large shareholders hold well diversified 
portfolios. While the large shareholders who hold smaller equity stakes tend to hold more diversified 
portfolios, this correlation is relatively low. These findings will be useful to future researchers in making 
appropriate assumptions of two types: first, assumptions regarding large shareholder diversification; and 
second, assumptions regarding the trade-off between holding a reasonably diversified portfolio and 
holding a dominant position in a relatively large firm.  
We exploit the heterogeneity in large shareholders’ portfolio diversification to investigate the 
impact of large shareholder diversification on corporate risk-taking. We report strong statistical evidence 
that firms controlled by diversified large shareholders are more likely to undertake riskier projects than 
firms controlled by non-diversified investors. The impact of large shareholder diversification on risk-
taking is also economically meaningful.  
We also show that the positive association between portfolio diversification and corporate risk-
taking is robust to the inclusion of shareholder fixed-effects which alleviates a possible omitted variable 
bias. We also run two tests to ensure that our results capture the true direction of causality. First, we use 
instrumental variables to extract the exogenous component of shareholder diversification. In particular, 
we develop IVs that capture the “natural” tendency to diversify across all large shareholders involved in 
similar types of activities. Second, we exploit successions as a natural experiment determining an 
exogenous shock to the portfolio of the heirs. Whether we use fixed-effects, instrumental variables, or 
exploit a natural experiment, we consistently find that portfolio diversification per se leads to (more) 
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Table I. Descriptive statistics 
 
No. Firms is the total number of firms in which a company’s largest ultimate shareholder (e.g., the ultimate 
shareholder controlling the largest fraction of voting rights in the firm) holds shares, directly or indirectly, in a given 
year, across all countries in our sample. The Herfindhal Index is the sum of the squared values of the weight that 
each investment has in a largest shareholder’s portfolio, ∑    
   
    . No. Sectors is the number of 4-digit primary SIC 
code sectors for the firms in the largest shareholder’s portfolio. Diversification Dummy is a binary variable that 
equals 1 if a shareholder holds more than one company in her portfolio, and zero otherwise. σ(ROA) is the 5-year 
volatility of a firm’s country-adjusted return on assets σ(ROA), where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to total assets. 
Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, where total debt includes non-current liabilities (long 
term debt and other non-current liabilities) and current liabilities (loans, accounts payable, and others). Sales Growth 
is the annual growth rate of sales. Ln (Size) is the natural log of total assets (in thousands US$), expressed in 1999 
prices, where total assets is the sum of fixed and current assets. Age is the number of years since incorporation. 
Ultimate Ownership measures the cash flow rights of the largest ultimate shareholder. In particular, assume that if a 
shareholder i owns a fraction     of the shares of firm Y, which owns a fraction     of the shares of firm J, then i 
will be entitled to a fraction               of the cash flows of J. Ultimate Control measures the voting rights of the 
largest ultimate shareholder. If a shareholder i owns a fraction     of the shares of firm Y, which owns a fraction     
of the shares of firm J, we measure shareholder i’s control over voting rights in J by the weakest link along the 
chain, i.e., the minimum of     and    .  
Panel A: Country distribution of observations  
 
Country  No. Firms %  Country  No. Firms  % 
Austria 476  0.38  Latvia  261  0.21 
Belgium 3,347  2.71  Liechtenstein  2  0.00 
Bulgaria 468  0.38  Lithuania  285  0.23 
Croatia 813  0.66  Luxembourg  2  0.00 
Czech Republic  191  0.15  Netherlands 3,711  3.00 
Denmark 4,491  3.63  Norway  4,526  3.66 
Estonia 204  0.16  Poland  1,622  1.31 
Finland 1,152  0.93  Portugal  1,791  1.45 
France 31,054  25.12 Russian  Federation  1,001  0.81 
Germany 2,518  2.04  Slovak  Republic 13  0.01 
Greece 5,128  4.15  Slovenia  9  0.01 
Hungary 4  0.00  Spain  19,351  15.65 
Iceland 12  0.01  Sweden  4,269  3.45 
Ireland 48  0.04  Switzerland  63  0.05 
Italy 2,965  2.40  United  Kingdom  33,863  27.39 












Table I. Descriptive statistics (Cont’d)  
 
Panel B: Summary statistics for the main dependent and independent variables 
 
Variable Mean  Median  Std.  Dev. 
Interquartile  
range Min.  Max. 
Investor-level statistics (82,479 investor-year observations) 
No. Firms  3.997  1  15.963  2  1  972 
Ln No. Firms  0.615  0  0.906  1.099  0  6.879 
1-Herfindhal Index  0.174  0  0.264  0.392  0  0.985 
No. Sectors  2.129  1  5.004  1  1  232 
Ln No. Sectors  0.367  0  0.655  0.693  0  5.447 
Diversification Dummy  0.435  0  0.496  1  0  1 
Firm-level statistics (123,640 firm-year observations) 
σ(ROA)  0.055 0.044  0.042  0.047  0.000  0.510 
Leverage 0.675  0.705  0.220  0.311  0.000  1.018 
ROA 0.071  0.060  0.102  0.099  -0.410  0.513 
Sales Growth  0.251  0.090  0.889  0.451  -0.978  3.024 
Ln (Size)  10.246  10.038  1.404  1.729  6.659  14.680 
Age 25.222  18  21.875  24  0  103 
Ln (1+Age)  2.938  2.944  0.843  1.157  0.000  4.644 
Ultimate Ownership  62.288  57.425  34.738  65.000  0.000  100 





Table II. Cross-sectional regressions  
 
This table reports OLS regression results. The dependent variable is the volatility of a firm’s country-adjusted return 
on assets σ(ROA)×100, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to total assets. We calculate the standard deviation of the 
country-adjusted returns of each firm over the entire sample period (1999-2007), requiring a minimum of 5 
observations, following John et al. (2008). Ln No. Firms is the natural log of the total number of firms in which a 
company’s largest ultimate shareholder (e.g., the ultimate shareholder controlling the largest fraction of voting rights 
in the firm) holds shares, directly or indirectly, in a given year, across all countries in our sample. The Herfindhal 
Index is the sum of the squared values of the weight that each investment has in a largest shareholder’s portfolio, 
∑    
   
    . Ln No. Sectors is the natural log of the number of 4-digit primary SIC code sectors for the firms in the 
largest shareholder’s portfolio. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets where total debt includes 
non-current liabilities (long term debt and other non-current liabilities) and current liabilities (loans, creditors and 
others). Sales Growth is the annual growth rate of sales. Ln (Size) is the natural log of total assets (in thousands 
US$), expressed in 1999 prices, where total assets is the sum of fixed and current assets. Ln (1+Age) is the natural 
log of (1 + the number of years since incorporation). All independent variables are measured at the first year-end of 
the period over which the volatility of earnings is measured. All cross-sectional tests include country and industry 
fixed effects. P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the industry level, are reported in brackets 
below the coefficients. The economic significance of the portfolio diversification variables is reported beneath the p-
values (in bold); this number is the percentage change in the value of the dependent variable in response to an 
increase from the first to the third quartile of the portfolio diversification variables. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Ln No. Firms  0.174***   
[0.000]   
6.859%   
(1-Herfindhal Index)  0.676***   
[0.000]   
7.924%   
Ln No. Sectors  0.211*** 
[0.000] 
5.248% 
Leverage  0.617*** 0.440*** 0.625*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ROA  2.117*** 2.971*** 2.110*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Sales Growth  0.155*** 0.147*** 0.157*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln (Size)  -0.629*** -0.580*** -0.623*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln (1+Age)  -0.160*** -0.153*** -0.161*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Intercept  10.074*** 9.609*** 10.084*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.127  0.126  0.126 
No. of observations  46,691  45,891  46,691 
  40 
 
Table III. Panel regressions  
 
This table reports OLS regression results. The dependent variable is the volatility of a firm’s country-adjusted return 
on assets σ(ROA)×100, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to total assets. We calculate the standard deviation of the 
country-adjusted returns of each firm over 5-year partially overlapping periods (1999-2003, 2000-2004, 2001-2005, 
2002-2006, and 2003-2007). Ln No. Firms is the natural log of the total number of firms in which a company’s 
largest ultimate shareholder (e.g., the ultimate shareholder controlling the largest fraction of voting rights in the 
firm) holds shares, directly or indirectly, in a given year, across all countries in our sample. The Herfindhal Index is 
the sum of the squared values of the weight that each investment has in a largest shareholder’s portfolio, ∑    
   
    . 
Ln No. Sectors is the natural log of the number of 4-digit primary SIC code sectors for the firms in the largest 
shareholder’s portfolio. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets where total debt includes non-
current liabilities (long term debt and other non-current liabilities) and current liabilities (loans, creditors and 
others). Sales Growth is the annual growth rate of sales. Ln (Size) is the natural log of total assets (in thousands 
US$), expressed in 1999 prices, where total assets is the sum of fixed and current assets. Ln (1+Age) is the natural 
log of (1 + the number of years since incorporation). All independent variables are measured at the first year-end of 
the period over which the volatility of earnings is measured. All regressions include shareholder and year fixed 
effects. P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the company level, are reported in brackets below 
the coefficients. The economic significance of the portfolio diversification variables is reported beneath the p-values 
(in bold); this number is the percentage change in the value of the dependent variable in response to an increase from 
the first to the third quartile of the portfolio diversification variables. 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Ln No. Firms  0.089***   
[0.010]   
4.279%   
(1-Herfindhal Index)  0.288**   
[0.015]   
4.323%   
Ln No. Sectors  0.127*** 
[0.003] 
4.161% 
Leverage  0.974*** 0.976*** 0.975*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ROA  -0.734** -0.632* -0.733** 
[0.039] [0.078] [0.039] 
Sales Growth  0.088*** 0.092*** 0.088*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln (Size)  -0.700*** -0.700*** -0.701*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln (1+Age)  -0.102*** -0.098*** -0.102*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Intercept  11.649*** 11.607*** 11.662*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Investor fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.416  0.401  0.416 
No. of observations  123,640  121,851  123,640 
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Table IV: Instrumental variables regressions 
In the second stage regressions, the dependent variable is the volatility of a firm’s country-adjusted return on assets 
σ(ROA)×100, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to total assets. We calculate the standard deviation of the country-
adjusted returns of each firm over the entire sample period (1999-2007), requiring a minimum of 5 observations, 
following John et al. (2008). In regression (1), we use Average Divers. (Same Country/Industry), defined as the 
average portfolio diversification of large shareholders across all other firms in the same country and industry as the 
firm in question, as instrument for Ln No. Firms. In regression (2), the IV is the Fraction of Other Firms (Same 
Country/Industry) With Diversified Investors, defined as the fraction of other firms in the same country and industry 
whose largest shareholder holds a diversified portfolio. In regression (3), which is run for the sub-set of non-U.K. 
firms, the IV is the Average Divers. (Same Industry/U.K.), defined as the average portfolio diversification of large 
shareholders across all U.K. firms from the industry as the firm in question. In regression (4), which is also run for 
the sub-set of non-U.K. firms, the IV is the Fraction of Other Firms (Same Industry/U.K.) With Diversified 
Investors, defined as the fraction of U.K. firms in the same industry whose largest shareholder holds a diversified 
portfolio. Ln No. Firms is the natural log of the total number of firms in which a company’s largest ultimate 
shareholder (e.g., the ultimate shareholder controlling the largest fraction of voting rights in the firm) holds shares, 
directly or indirectly, in a given year, across all countries in our sample. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt 
to total assets where total debt includes non-current liabilities (long term debt and other non-current liabilities) and 
current liabilities (loans, creditors and others). Sales Growth is the annual growth rate of sales. Ln (Size) is the 
natural log of total assets (in thousands US$), expressed in 1999 prices, where total assets is the sum of fixed and 
current assets. Ln (1+Age) is the natural log of (1 + the number of years since incorporation). All independent 
variables are measured at the first year-end of the period over which the volatility of earnings is measured. P-values, 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity are reported in brackets below the coefficients.  Hausman test is the Hausman test of 
endogeneity for the difference between the OLS and the IV estimators. 
 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
Sample  Whole Sample  Non-U.K. Firms 
Second stage regressions: 
Ln No. Firms (fitted)  2.462***  2.254***  4.943***  6.116*** 
[0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Leverage -0.138  -0.0862  -0.804***  -0.926*** 
[0.269] [0.476]  [0.000]  [0.00246] 
ROA  2.020***  2.084*** 3.551*** 3.744*** 
[0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Sales Growth  0.073***  0.077***  -0.027  -0.067 
[0.000]  [0.000] [0.563] [0.364] 
Ln  (Size)  -1.257***  -1.172*** -2.084*** -2.490*** 
[0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln  (1+Age)  -0.402***  -0.387*** -0.357*** -0.373*** 
[0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Intercept  16.03***  15.36*** 21.14*** 23.86*** 
[0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Country fixed effects  No  No  No  No 
Industry fixed effects  No  No  No  No 
No. of observations  46,574  46,502  34,935  34,935 
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Table IV: Instrumental variables regressions (Cont’d) 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Sample  Whole Sample  Non-U.K. Firms 
First stage regressions: 
IV: Average Divers. (Same Country/Industry)  0.506***     
[0.000]    
IV: Fraction of Other Firms (Same Country/ 
Industry) With Diversified Investors   2.023***   
 
[0.000]    
IV: Average Divers. (Same Industry/U.K.)  0.139***   
[0.000]   
IV: Fraction of Other Firms (Same Industry/ 
U.K.) With Diversified Investors     0.441*** 
 [0.000] 
Partial R-squared of excluded instruments  0.032  0.034  0.001  0.000 
F-test of excluded instruments  1,386  1,969  40.73  14.62 
Hausman test (p-values)  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
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Table V: Successions 
 
To identify successions, we first search for all instances in which a company’s largest shareholder changes. We then 
restrict the sample to those instances in which the departed shareholder disappears from the ownership structure of a 
given firm in the years subsequent to the ownership change. We further require that the new and the departed 
shareholder share the same last name. Finally, we run keyword searches in Lexis-Nexis, Factiva, and Google to 
identify (and remove) any instances in which the transaction in question is described as something other than a 
succession (e.g., a sale of shares).  In Panel A, we examine the change in corporate risk-taking among companies 
experiencing an exogenous change in the identity of their largest shareholder (succession). No. Firms (departed; 
pre-succession) is the number of firms in the portfolio of the departed largest shareholder, as measured before the 
succession. No. Firms (heir; post-succession) is the number of firms in the portfolio of the heir, as measured 
immediately after the succession. In Panel B, we examine the change in risk-taking across all other firms in the 
portfolio of the heir following the succession. Of course, this test can only be run to the extent that the heir held 
stocks in at least one company prior to the succession. No. Firms (heir, pre-succession) is the number of (other) 
firms in the portfolio of the heir, as measured before the succession. For both tests, we require 5 years of (ROA) data 
pre-succession as well as 5 years of data post-succession in order to measure changes in the level of risk-taking.  
σ(ROA)×100 is the volatility of a firm’s country-adjusted return on assets (ROA), where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to 
total assets. 
 
Panel A: Change in risk-taking following a change in the 
 identity of the largest shareholder 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
P-value of diff. 
pre- vs. post- 
No. Firms (departed; pre-succession)  84  4.119  6.587  1  52 
No. Firms (heir; post-succession)  84  3.784  4.251  1  18 
σ(ROA)×100 (pre-succession)  84  4.496 5.198 0.119 33.325  0.079 
σ(ROA)×100 (post-succession)  84  3.811  3.918  0.422 22.696 
 
Panel B: Change in risk-taking across all other firms in the portfolio of the heir 
Variable Obs Mean Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
P-value of diff. 
pre- vs. post- 
No. Firms (heir, pre-succession)  29  3.690  4.714  1  24 
No. Firms (heir, post-succession)  29  7.655  4.616  2  18 
σ(ROA)×100 (pre-succession)  29  4.847 3.207 0.762 12.944  0.090 
σ(ROA)×100 (post-succession)  29  7.003  8.747  1.000 45.767 
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Table VI: Robustness tests: Alternative definitions of the dependent variable  
In Panel A, we report the results for Logit regressions analyzing the likelihood of survival over a 5-year period. In Panel B, the 
dependent variable is the difference between the maximum and minimum values of firm’s country-adjusted return on assets, ×100. ROA 
is the ratio of EBIT to total assets. In Panel C, the dependent variable is the volatility of a firm’s country-adjusted return on equity 
σ(ROE)×100. ROE is defined as the ratio of net income to total shareholders’ funds. In Panels B and C, columns (1) - (3) report the 
results for cross-sectional regressions; Columns (4) - (6) report results for panel regressions. Ln No. Firms is the natural log of the total 
number of firms in which a company’s largest ultimate shareholder (e.g., the ultimate shareholder controlling the largest fraction of 
voting rights in the firm) holds shares, directly or indirectly, in a given year, across all countries in our sample. The Herfindhal Index is 
the sum of the squared values of the weight that each investment has in a largest shareholder’s portfolio, ∑    
   
    . Ln No. Sectors is the 
natural log of the number of 4-digit primary SIC code sectors for the firms in the largest shareholder’s portfolio. Leverage is defined as 
the ratio of total debt to total assets where total debt includes non-current liabilities (long term debt and other non-current liabilities) and 
current liabilities (loans, creditors and others). Sales Growth is the annual growth rate of sales. Ln (Size) is the natural log of total assets 
(in thousands US$), expressed in 1999 prices, where total assets is the sum of fixed and current assets. Ln (1+Age) is the natural log of (1 
+ the number of years since incorporation). All independent variables are measured at the first year-end of the period over which the 
volatility of earnings is measured. All cross-sectional tests include country and industry fixed effects. All panel regressions include 
shareholder and year fixed effects. P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the industry level, are reported in brackets 
below the coefficients. In the panel regressions, standard errors are also adjusted for clustering at the company level. The economic 
significance of the portfolio diversification variables is reported beneath the p-values (in bold); this number is the percentage change in 
the value of the dependent variable in response to an increase from the first to the third quartile of the portfolio diversification variables. 
 
Panel A: Likelihood of survival  
(1) (2) (3) 
Ln No. Firms  -0.082***   
[0.000]  
-2.700%  
(1-Herfindhal Index)  -0.269***   
[0.000]  
-6.600%  
Ln No. Sectors  -0.098*** 
[0.000] 
-2.100% 
Leverage -0.049  -0.020  -0.052 
[0.124] [0.534] [0.102] 
ROA 1.744***  1.704***  1.748*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Sales Growth  0.041***  0.040***  0.040*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln (Size)  0.208***  0.195***  0.204*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln (1+Age)  0.068***  0.063***  0.068*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Intercept -3.525***  -3.436***  -3.518*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Pseudo R-squared  0.099  0.097  0.098 
No. of observations  103,312  100,962  103,312 45 
 
 
Table VI: Robustness tests: Alternative definitions of the dependent variable (Cont’d) 
Panel B: Max(ROA)-Min(ROA)  
Cross-sectional tests    Panel regressions   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ln No. Firms  0.440***    0.206**  
[0.000]    [0.011]  
6.538%    3.650%   
(1-Herfindhal Index)  1.670***    0.689**  
[0.000]    [0.014]  
7.402%    3.641%   
Ln No. Sectors  0.538*** 0.294*** 
[0.000] [0.004] 
5.044% 3.287% 
Leverage  1.705*** 1.269*** 1.723*** 2.374*** 2.374*** 2.375*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
ROA 6.015***  8.243***  5.997***  -1.319  -1.048  -1.319 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.114] [0.213] [0.115] 
Sales  Growth  0.429*** 0.407*** 0.434*** 0.211*** 0.220*** 0.211*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln  (Size)  -1.639*** -1.513*** -1.626*** -1.689*** -1.689*** -1.690*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln  (1+Age)  -0.223*** -0.212*** -0.225*** -0.216*** -0.207*** -0.217*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] 
Intercept  24.579*** 23.442*** 24.621*** 28.055*** 27.943*** 28.085*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Investor fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj.  R-squared  0.123 0.122 0.123 0.418 0.404 0.418 
No. of observations  46,691  45,894  46,691  123,640  121,851  123,640 
  46 
 
Table VI: Robustness tests: Alternative definitions of the dependent variable (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C: σ(ROE)  
Cross-sectional tests    Panel regressions   
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Ln No. Firms  1.540***    0.679**   
[0.000]    [0.019]   
11.637%    5.665%   
(1-Herfindhal Index)  6.263***    1.977**   
[0.000]    [0.048]   
14.101%    5.729%   
Ln No. Sectors  1.819*** 0.907*** 
[0.000] [0.009] 
8.672% 5.125% 
Leverage 56.204***  53.743***  56.280***  59.982***  59.883***  59.987*** 
[0.000] [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
ROE -0.106  -0.034  -0.088  2.188***  2.264***  2.188*** 
[0.476] [0.819]  [0.551]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Sales Growth  -0.130  0.032  -0.062  -0.361**  -0.354**  -0.362** 
[0.450] [0.853]  [0.719]  [0.018]  [0.021]  [0.018] 
Ln (Size)  -1.378***  -1.224***  -1.381***  -1.840***  -1.831***  -1.841*** 
[0.000] [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Ln (1+Age)  4.477***  2.656***  4.485***  -0.776***  -0.738***  -0.777*** 
[0.000] [0.001]  [0.000]  [0.004]  [0.006]  [0.004] 
Intercept   -16.245*** -17.133*** -16.337***  3.738*  5.610***  3.810* 
[0.000] [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.061]  [0.006]  [0.056] 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Industry fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Investor fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time fixed effects  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.172  0.158  0.171  0.395  0.363  0.395 





Table VII: Other robustness tests  
The dependent variable is the volatility of a firm’s country-adjusted return on assets σ(ROA)×100, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to total assets. We calculate 
the standard deviation of the country-adjusted returns of each firm over the entire sample period (1999-2007), requiring a minimum of 5 observations, 
following John et al. (2008). Ln No. Firms is the natural log of the total number of firms in which a company’s largest ultimate shareholder (e.g., the ultimate 
shareholder controlling the largest fraction of voting rights in the firm) holds shares, directly or indirectly, in a given year, across all countries in our sample. 
Diversification Dummy is a binary variable that equals 1 if a shareholder holds more than one company in her portfolio, and zero otherwise. Fraction of Wealth 
the ratio of the value of the investment made in that given firm over the shareholder’s total wealth. Ultimate Ownership measures the cash flow rights of the 
largest ultimate shareholder. In particular, assume that if a shareholder i owns a fraction     of the shares of firm Y, which owns a fraction     of the shares of 
firm J, then i will be entitled to a fraction               of the cash flows of J. Ln No. Sectors is the natural log of the number of 4-digit primary SIC code 
sectors for the firms in the largest shareholder’s portfolio. Anti-Self-Dealing Index “is formed by summing: (1) vote by mail; (2) shares not deposited; (3) 
cumulative voting; (4) oppressed minority; (5) pre-emptive rights; and (6) capital to call a meeting.” This index is taken from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2008).  Aggregate Earnings Management Score is the average rank across “the country’s median ratio of the firm-level standard deviations 
of operating income and operating cash flow,” “the country’s Spearman correlation between the change in accruals and the change in cash flow from operations,” 
“the country’s median ratio of the absolute value of accruals and the absolute value of the cash flow from operations” and the “number of “small profits” divided 
by the number of “small losses” for each country.” This index is taken from Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006). Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to 
total assets where total debt includes non-current liabilities (long term debt and other non-current liabilities) and current liabilities (loans, creditors and others). 
Sales Growth is the annual growth rate of sales. Ln (Size) is the natural log of total assets (in thousands US$), expressed in 1999 prices, where total assets is the 
sum of fixed and current assets. Ln (1+Age) is the natural log of (1 + the number of years since incorporation). All independent variables are measured at the first 
year-end of the period over which the volatility of earnings is measured. All cross-sectional tests include country and industry fixed effects. P-values, adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the industry level, are reported in brackets below the coefficients. The economic significance of the portfolio diversification 
variables is reported beneath the p-values (in bold); this number is the percentage change in the value of the dependent variable in response to an increase from 
the first to the third quartile of the portfolio diversification variables. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Type of  
Robustness Test: 
Different  

















(e.g. > 50%) 
Ln No. Firms  0.212*** 0.170*** 0.194*** 0.187*** 0.183*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
8.357% 6.669% 8.215% 6.874% 5.238% 
Diversification Dummy  0.571***   
[0.000]   
10.244%   
(1-Fraction of Wealth)  0.644***   
[0.000]   48 
 
10.742%   
Ultimate Ownership  0.004***  
[0.000]  
Ln No. Sectors   -0.134***  
[0.000]  
Anti-Self-Dealing Index  1.767***  
[0.000]  
Aggregate Earnings  
Management Score  -0.033***  
[0.000]  
Leverage  0.648***  -0.118  0.596*** 0.585*** 0.677*** 0.392*** 0.810*** 
[0.000] [0.232] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] 
ROA  2.198*** 4.618*** 2.128*** 2.091*** 2.408*** 2.486*** 2.469*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Sales Growth  0.152*** 0.128*** 0.154*** 0.150*** 0.167*** 0.123*** 0.184*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln (Size)  -0.619*** -0.536*** -0.631*** -0.618*** -0.598*** -0.544*** -0.620*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ln (1+Age)  -0.148*** -0.152*** -0.157*** -0.165*** -0.177*** -0.167*** -0.112*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Intercept  9.729*** 9.450*** 9.741***  10.119***  12.755***  9.387*** 9.744*** 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Country fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared  0.127 0.133 0.127 0.129 0.101 0.125 0.120 
No. of observations  46,691 44,670 46,691 42,434 42,209 34,940 32,483 
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Appendix A: Data Quality  
 
A.  Ownership Data 
The ownership data that we use to compute ultimate ownership, ultimate control, and the 
shareholder diversification variables are gathered by Amadeus from a variety of sources: official bodies, 
associated information providers (i.e., Jordans for Ireland and the U.K.; Coface for France; Lexis-Nexis 
for the Netherlands), and directly from the companies themselves.  To assess the quality of the ownership 
data in Amadeus, we compare the stake held by the largest direct shareholder, as reported in Amadeus, 
with the same information from alternative sources. We check data from three markets for which the 
collection of ownership data from online sources is relatively easy: Italy, Spain, and the U.K. For each of 
these countries, we collect year-end data for 2007 for a sample of 100 firms. For Italy, we obtain official 
data for publicly-traded firms from the Italian Stock Exchange.
17 For Spain, the official data are from the 
Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores.
18 For the U.K., the data come from the Hemscott-Corporate 
Register.
19  
For these companies, we compute the correlation coefficient between the ownership of the largest 
shareholder as reported in Amadeus and that reported in the alternative sources. The overall correlation 
coefficient is 0.87. Although this coefficient appears to be reasonably high, two caveats are in order. First, 
the ownership data in Amadeus appears to be noisier in the U.K. In particular, while the correlation 
coefficient between the ownership of the largest shareholder as reported in Amadeus and that reported in 
the alternative sources is 0.89 for the Spanish sample, and 0.83 for the Italian sample, it is only 0.67 for 
the U.K. sample. These discrepancies are due, at least in part, to differences in the dates on which 
ownership changes are recorded in the different data sources. (As the market for corporate control is 
relatively more liquid in the U.K., one would expect to find more discrepancies in the U.K. ownership 






results are robust to the exclusion of U.K. firms. The second caveat is that in some cases, the name of the 
largest direct shareholder as reported in Amadeus does not match the name in the official data sources. 
Unfortunately, given the size of the database, it is not possible to manually check all entries. However, we 
have no reason to think that this inconsistency in the ownership data would result in anything other than 
noise in the data. Thus, if anything, it should bias against finding significant results.  
B.   Accounting Data 
We use two tests to assess the accuracy of the accounting data. First, for a random sample of 250 
publicly-traded companies covered in Amadeus, we collect data on “total assets” at year-end 2007 from 
Datastream. We then compute the correlation coefficient between the total assets as reported in Amadeus 
for 2007 and that reported in Datastream. The correlation coefficient is 0.93. Further, for a random 
sample of 250 privately-held firms, we gather data on total assets at year-end 2007 from OneSource, a 
database which contains a limited amount of basic information for more than half a million public and 
private businesses across nineteen European countries.
20 We then compute the correlation coefficient 
between the total assets as reported in Amadeus and that reported in OneSource. The correlation 
coefficient is 0.98. Based on these calculations, we conclude that the accounting data in Amadeus appear 





Appendix B. Selection criteria   
A. OWNERSHIP DATA  Total   B. ACCOUNTING DATA  Total  
Initial ownership database (1999-2003)  1,315,558 shareholder-
years 
Initial accounting dataset for non-financial 
companies with at least one year of ROA 
data (1999-2007)  
1,754,714 firm-years 
 
- Cross-held companies  - 2,890 firm-years      
- Shareholders disclosed in Amadeus as 
“aggregate categories” 
- 41,878 shareholder-years 
 




- State-owned firms  - 24,482 firm-years     
Total Number of Observations 1,198,372 shareholder-
years 
 645,394 firm-years 
(243,856 firms) 





C. MERGED PANEL   Total  
Merged ownership (1999-2003) and ROA volatility data (1999-2007)  332,301 firm-years 
(50,049 firms) 
-  Firms with missing data for the main control variables  - 208,661 firm-years 
Final sample  123,640 firm-years  
(46,691 firms)  
 